The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University came out with a fantastic, information-packed study entitled “China’s out of area naval operations: Case studies, trajectories, obstacles and potential solutions” (ChinaStrategicPerspectives3).
There is a lot of good, solid research here, and I commend the authors. It’s great, and my comments (those that follow below and later) should not in any way detract from the report. With that caveat, I find the constant drumbeat about China’s lack of territorial ambition somewhat odd and demonstrably at odds with the facts. Here’s what the authors wrote about Chinese ambitions:
Establish bases on acquired territory. Given our prior observations about the Chinese position on stationing troops permanently on foreign soil, this option is highly unlikely. There is a compelling strategic rationale not to acquire the territory of another sovereign state. At present, China’s grand strategy is to continue to modernize and develop economically—that is, to develop within the international system
as it is constructed now. To violate the sovereignty of another state is to directly challenge the international system, and hence, the authority of the other great powers—especially the United States. China simply has no pressing reason to do that now or in the near future.
That’s baloney. It’s as if the Paracel annexation and Spratly islands never existed (and, for that matter, amphibious landings never happened there either. I suppose the PLA cadres just sprung from the native soil of the unrecognized motherland, right?). Look, China has a history of violating the sovereignty of other states when such a violation is 1) in China’s interest and 2) has little chance of provoking a response from larger powers. China has, to date, done pretty well in the territorial expansion department, and with a decades-long record out there for public examination, I do not understand why we seem to be imposing our own hopes upon our strategic assessments.
What is with the water in Washington, DC? The groupthinky mirror-imaging mantra about Chinese intent is really tiresome.
China is neither rapacious, nor is it a saint, either. Let’s take a deep breath and move on from there.
{ 11 comments… read them below or add one }
Sorry to be late coming back to the discussion!
“And in the case of naval force planning, the potential geopolitical realities 20 years from now absolutely matter for strategy today…”
(Not quoting the whole paragraph, but just for space)
I think those are largely fair points, particularly from the Chinese perspective. But I think it’s also crucial to bear in mind the near-hysteria with which Japan was viewed in the late 80s and early 90s, to the point where a number of authors were writing bestsellers predicting a coming war and the eclipse of American hegemony. Sound familiar?
My retort would be simply that preparing for what *might* come 20 years down the line isn’t cost-effective for the US. Ten years ago, *no one* saw us invading Afghanistan in a mere 10 months, let alone still there 10 years later. Terrorism was an issue, certainly, but far from the most important. Building a fleet largely oriented against Chinese expansion (which I don’t think we are, but then, I’m not sure even USN knows what their current strategy is) doesn’t make sense, to me, at least not yet
“Being an economic power is great, but if America cannot ensure it controls the Caribbean or maintain vital sea lines of communication on its own, it is not a real great power.”
It’s not clear if you’re arguing that this is part of your argument that China is misreading Mahan or not.
Regardless, I think the crucial difference here would be that by and large, the US was stepping into a power vacuum in the Caribbean and, sort of incidentally, the Pacific. The seas around China have some *very* interested parties, including the world’s second most powerful navy (Japan), as well as a host of lesser powers, who may not hit in the same weight class as the Chinese, but do have a collective interest in denying them what they want.
I would argue that the best strategy to approach a potentially expansionist China is currently containment via diplomacy. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Japan, Australia and South Korea all share a collective interest there. That’s a basis for something. Certainly, not a NATO or even SEATO. But something, nonetheless.
Even a concerted diplomatic front at this point would be significant — had all of those actors responded strongly and deliberately to the Chinese fishing boat’s intrusion in Japanese waters last fall, it would have been a very strong message to the Chinese.
Well, Yoshihara and Holmes have made some good studies of how Chinese strategists are increasingly interested in Mahan, and there’s also been a lot of chatter lately about Chinese interest in German anti-liberals like Carl Schmitt.
I agree that China is recognizing the way the US shoved its way onto the global stage, but they’re recognizing the military role as well, and I think the interest in Mahan proves instructive here (although we could argue the Chinese are misreading Mahan). US economic growth, along with Chinese growth, drove each country out of relatively isolated international postures, and produced political, economic, and prestige motives for a stronger international presence. Mahan and the imperialists believed that sustaining US economic growth needed a stronger US geopolitical presence, that the flag and commerce were mutually reinforcing.
The “economic weapon” only got the Americans so far, in their eyes – it needed an overseas presence and fleet, which would add, not detract, to its potency. Being an economic power is great, but if America cannot ensure it controls the Caribbean or maintain vital sea lines of communication on its own, it is not a real great power.
I imagine the Chinese feel much the same way about the seas between its territory and the “first island chain.”
And in the case of naval force planning, the potential geopolitical realities 20 years from now absolutely matter for strategy today – the ships the Chinese are building now are built with 10-20 years from now, since they won’t come into service for years and will be in service decades beyond that. Obviously we can’t know what Chinese intentions will be in that moment, but given what ideas are floating around the Chinese defense/foreign policy community today, and the kind of investments in capabilities they’re making now, I think it’s safer to assume that Chinese leaders believe they’re reaching the point of stagnating or diminishing returns to their old strategy of economic power, and looking to protect and bolster that economic capability with the hard (and soft!) power a larger navy and international interventions can provide. Hopefully that makes more sense.
I don’t have time to comment beyond saying that this is a great conversation! I’ll get back on here tonight and add a few bits. Good stuff.
@Craig Hooper: “this should be a recipe for sustained, happy growth, yes…but…never underestimate the power of nationalism to push countries into making “irrational” decisions!”
Please don’t take me in the wrong way — I don’t attribute shiny-happy-feelings to the PRC leadership. My point is that their economic growth is a weapon. One that is in large part aimed at us. In other words, their economic growth is, in large part, a recognition, and repeat, of the way in which the US shoved its way onto the global stage, at the early part of the last century.
@DPTrombly: “their growth needs to be sustained, but they’re worried about the geopolitical infrastructure that provides the foundation for Chinese trade policy than backlash, and more worried about the consequences of tying the country’s growth and social stability to the political cooperation of foreign powers than the deleterious effects of pushing China’s perimeter outwards in the South China Sea and West Pacific.”
Can you edit that? I know you’re making a point (and I’m *not* trying to be snide, I think I know what you’re saying), but I’d like to see it in a better context in order to argue the point.
If it adds anything, I wouldn’t care to guess where the geopolitical reality will be in 20 years, but I’m of the opinion that that ought not to drive our current strategic thinking.
@DPTrombly: Do I dare ask!?
Whoops, that’s me, not you, Capnvan… Mea culpa
Capnvan, the problem is you could have said this about any industrializing country at any point. Why wouldn’t they just sit back and reap the benefits of free trade?
All industrial nations outgrow this policy, because economic rationality does not trump political rationality (or instincts). China’s extremely high growth inevitably translates into further flung international interests, which by political reason, need to be defended, as well as a sense of great power prestige and a desire to back up that wealth with a stronger foreign policy. Just as for Britain and the United States, this involved gunboat diplomacy (and in some cases territorial aggrandizement), we shouldn’t be surprised when China outgrows its phase of quiet diplomacy.
The “narrative” of China’s peaceful rise and restrained power is vital only to China’s future competitors, for the Chinese leadership, it is just another doctrine adapted to the circumstances of the day. We don’t need to speculate about China’s strategy changing, because it already is. There’s a lot of danger in mirror-imaging with China because we’re currently convinced that military adventurism is always counterproductive and that we need to focus more on growth.
But my guess is that the PRC’s leaders are thinking differently today – their growth needs to be sustained, but they’re worried about the geopolitical infrastructure that provides the foundation for Chinese trade policy than backlash, and more worried about the consequences of tying the country’s growth and social stability to the political cooperation of foreign powers than the deleterious effects of pushing China’s perimeter outwards in the South China Sea and West Pacific.
(http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Shambaugh.pdf might be of interest – the more nationalistic and geopolitically ambitious “realists” are winning out in Chinese foreign policy debates)
Capnvan–I hear you; this should be a recipe for sustained, happy growth, yes…but…never underestimate the power of nationalism to push countries into making “irrational” decisions!
The Paracels took place back during the Mao days. China is a *far* different place today.
Of course you’re right, they’re far from saintly. But they’ve recognized that they can play their hand effectively without suffering the blowback that might otherwise come from a more aggressive play.
Look at how important they’ve become in Africa (quietly, to the Western press). They’ve largely kept a low official profile, outside of the few conflict zones that pop up (e.g. Sudan). Instead, they’re in the process of creating their own neo-mercantilist system, based on raw imports from less developed states and exports to consumer-based economies.
And it’s working magnificently for them. To the tune of 8-10% annual GDP growth, on a sustained basis.
If they were to undertake any kind of military adventurism, that narrative would be immediately threatened.
Under what circumstances can you see the Chinese leadership deciding that their current, extraordinarily successful, strategy should change? I can only see two. First, the US decides to play serious hardball on currency and trade deficits. Second, peak oil hits sooner and harder than anyone expects.
Otherwise, they’re ascending. Why chance that on anything so minor as the islands in the E. China Sea, particularly when they can prevent any resolution anyway?
“China is neither rapacious, nor is it a saint, either.”
Ditto for this on its even more long-term historical record. I often hear in the East Asian studies area talk of how China does not have a history of imperialism so it’s not part of their traditional culture, not like those devious Japanese. Well they certainly did not have as an expansive colonial policy as European powers did and maybe that is something, but the sino-centric “tributary” system, and before that the unification of ‘China’ into something vaguely what it is today, were not exactly accidents of political administration either.