Reserve was supposed to be training for was downgraded in favor of augmentation. Before 1970, Reserve units had never been issued appropriate equipment due to the lack of both finances and interest on the part of the regulars. The Coast Guard did not want to make Reserve units into





Military Swords

We have your family heirloom to pass down.

718-471-5464 www.totalnavy.com

Antique Reproduction Seachests



Liberty Carvings Inc. P0 Bex 281 Jamestown, RI 02835 www.fineweodcarving.com

custom ship designs accepted

"We Were There"

The USS *Indianapolis* New Book By LCdr. L. Peter Wren, USNR (Ret.)

The USS Indianapolis tragedy is best told by the Sailors, Airmen, and Medics who were there. Of the crew of 1,197 men, only 317 sunvived. The crews from the aircraft and rescue and burial ships share their experiences with the reader as they recall memories they have suppressed for years. Wren is a boat officer from the USS Bassett and helped save 152 survivors. Now, in this book, he tells the rest of the story.

Soft Cover \$15.95; Hard Cover \$25.95 Make checks or money orders payable to:

WREN ENTERPRIZES


1011 Ridgetop Road, Richmond, VA 23229-6733

entities that could truly mobilize.

In 1992 the Coast Guard further downgraded its port security readiness by downsizing Reserve personnel. This continued until the shock of 9/11. Now the port security mission has become a priority for the regulars though not for the Reserve. Instead, the Reserve's mission of integration remains the focus as exemplified by the Coast Guard's refusal to create Reserve Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs). Ensign Lanz clearly demonstrates the root cause of the boat crew training problem: trying to have Reservists serve two distinct and different missions.

The solutions to the current training di-

The Finest US Naval Rings Out There.





1ST NAVAL





MARINER

FRITAGE

andmade, deeply sculpted and extreme in detail, there are no other rings like them in the world. Fine quality craftsmanship and exclusive designs set this collection apart from all other rings. Each one is custom made, one at a time, to your exact size and fit. Made in the USA. 100% Guaranteed.

Aveilable in Sterling Silver, 10k, 14k & 18k Gold

Mike Carroll
The Carroll Collection
16144 W. Port Clinton Road
Prairle View, IL 60069
847-821-1333

www.eaglerings.com



W

lemma offered by Ensign Lanz, while helpful and innovative, will not solve the basic conflicting priorities within the Coast Guard Reserve, nor will they help senior Reservists achieve leadership experience. As for the Naval Reserve, the situation will become much worse when the Navy destroys its reserve military units in order to achieve "cost effective" reserve augmentation by individuals into the regular Navy. The loss of military units will be very traumatic for Naval Reservists as they face their own readiness challenges in much larger bodies of water.

tora

dor

the

Ala

181

on

Sut

tegi

sma

the

nav

an c

nor

rect

with

sma

duc

ican

The

mar

of §

asse

of s

blue

itse.

are

veni

loca

H

N

"A Gunboat Navy for the 21st Century"

(See E. Kimura, pp. 44-46, July 2005 Proceedings)

Craig Hooper—Mr. Kimura did a good job of dressing his big ship advocacy in the historical record. However, a closer look at history suggests that cheap and maneuverable smaller craft can, when well led, serve effectively as strategic instruments of sea power.

In the Baltic Sea, during the 18th century Russo-Sweden conflict, Russia defied convention by deploying shallow-draft oar-driven galleys to wage a successful littoral campaign along the coast of Finland. The "superior" Swedish Navy, overweighted toward conventional deep-draft ships, could do little as Russian forces seized the port of Helsinki and other facilities necessary for sustaining Swedish naval operations in the Gulf of Finland. In the summer of 1714, unsupported Russian galleys trapped and seized a division of larger Swedish ships at the Battle of Gangut (or Hango), clearing the way for uncontested Russian littoral operations throughout the entire upper Baltic.

The war-burdened Swedish government lacked the financial resources to build a balanced fleet. Ultimately, Russia's lit-

Fill out a request form at www.usni.org

Naval Institute REPRINT program

U.S. Naval Institute's Reprint Program is an opportunity for you to have customized copies of articles featured in *Proceedings* and *Naval History*.

For more information on U.S. Naval Institute's Reprint Program, or to order, please visit magreprints@usni.org or call 410.295.1073.

Use them as

- Handouts for tradeshows, sales meetings and conferences
- Press releases and media kits
- New product announcements
- Potential investor information

toral success translated into blue water dominance of the Gulf of Bothnia and the seizure of the strategically important Aland Islands.

A century later, during the War of 1812, British military planners focused on their fleet of large ships-of-the-line. Subsequently, they overlooked the strategic importance of the Great Lakes—a small ship, "brown water" theater-and the British failure to construct a viable naval deterrent on the lakes gave America an opening to seize control of the crucial northern frontier.

Naval competitors are learning the correct lessons from America's experience with Jeffersonian-era gunboats, and using small ship commands as a means to introduce the more audacious aspects of American naval leadership to their officer corps. The new Chinese fleet of high-speed catamarans and the small "patrol boat" navies of Southeast Asia serve as both strategic assets and as incubators, grooming a cadre of sophisticated military leaders for future blue water operations.

History has a nasty habit of repeating itself. If successful small ship projects are smothered to protect gold-plated conventional vessels, America risks ceding local blue-water superiority to adroit lit-

toral forces surrounding the vital-and increasingly contested-island nations of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

America needs a truly balanced fleet. Sea control is critical, but in the immediate future, American national security strategy rests on America's ability to influence events through the innovative application of littoral power. In the post 9/11 world, bigger is not always better-just as conflict isn't always settled by gunfire.

"RAF Proposes Nimrod Modification"

(See N. Friedman, pp. 88-89, August 2005 Proceedings)

Dr. Andrew Dorman, Senior Lecturer, King's College London-Norman Friedman's column on the proposed equipping of Nimrod aircraft with a variant of the Storm Shadow missile incorrectly identifies this as a threat to the proposed acquisition of two new aircraft carriers by the United Kingdom.

The proposal, if accepted, might actually facilitate the acquisition of these ships because the idea is not an alternative to aircraft carriers but rather a cheaper alternative to the acquisition of the next generation of strategic deterrent, the ballistic missile submarine. If an airbased deterrent costs less, it would free resources for other areas of defense, such as the acquisition of new carriers. The issue of whether and/or how to replace Britain's existing Trident force poses the greatest threat to the Royal Navy's carrier force, not the modification of a few Nimrod aircraft. Past rivalries may still exist but they should not be overstated. Within the modern Ministry of Defence, the most valid criteria is effect.

"Hard to Believe"

(See N. Friedman, pp. 120-122, May 2005 Proceedings)

Commander William E. Brooks, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Your magazine noted on the decommissioning of the USS Vincennes (CG-49) that the name will be "forever" associated with the shoot-down of the Iranian Airbus.

Does that mean the name Vincennes no longer will be connected to the first ship of the U.S. Navy to circumnavigate the globe as flagship of the Great Exploring Expedition; the ship which proved Antarctica is a continent; the ship which brought back a collection of artifacts and plants which led directly to creation of the Smithsonian Institution and the U.S. Botanic Garden; the ship which provided

