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Force Structure

Every QDR season, Wayne Hughes rousts himself from his Naval Postgraduate School hideout and mounts a push for his beloved teeny-tiny combatant–the “Seafighter”.  His latest, “Sustaining American Maritime Influence,” published in the September 2013 USNI Proceedings, is his usual salesman-like effort (in which he is joined by retired Admiral John Harvey, NPS Operations Research heavy-hitter, […]

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The USN and Long-Term Strategy

by admin on September 30, 2013

Failure to tether the U.S. Navy to a clear, large-scale and long-term strategy has reduced overall naval effectiveness as a strategic asset, raising a risk of the fleet being frittered away in activities that do not directly support strong strategic (longer-term)  national objectives. (For background go here, here, and here) In years past, the Navy fought […]

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What happens when U.S. Navy priorities, Department of Defense priorities and and the Obama Administration’s National Interests are misaligned?  And what are the implications when the differing priorities each suggest a very, very different future for the Navy? There is a dilemma afoot here.  Think back to why the Navy lost the fight to keep […]

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There is nothing inherent in the Chinese Navy that makes their fleet more successful than anybody else’s in the world.  By rights, the PLA(N) shouldn’t move the needle; the Chinese Navy is growing, but it is still small, relatively low-tech and untested.  It’s just that the Chinese government has, for the past quarter-century, used their […]

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While naval analysts love to compare raw naval power between navies (hull numbers, ship types, gun calibers, etc.), relative assessments of tactical naval performance or strategic effectiveness are harder to come by. Static, hull-based capability measurements are less controversial and far more comforting–I mean, policymakers have been comparing ships and fleet size since Athens first […]

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A National Security Strategy is, by nature, a selfish document. If there is a place for timorous national security bureaucrats to embrace their inner Theodore Roosevelt, the National Security Strategy is it. We compose a national strategy because this is where we, as Americans, explain how we intend to secure the survival of the United States. But, […]

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The much ballyhooed Center For Naval Analysis (CNA) report, “The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake” is not a document that should guide high-level naval decision-makers. As I have written before, the policy suggestions are based on some really questionable assumptions and the report is inattentive to detail. OPNAV NOOX could have […]

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In Press: NextNavy talks Rank Inflation

by Craig Hooper on June 22, 2010

Andrew Tilghman, reporting in the June 28 Navy Times, talked to NextNavy.com about a story coming out (sorry no link available) on the Navy’s problems with rank inflation: Since 2003, the Navy’s active-duty end strength has dropped from about 380,000 to about 330,000, a reduction of about 15 percent. And yet, the size of the […]

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Maritime strategy: Confronting comfortable bias

by Craig Hooper on April 10, 2010

The Center for Naval Analyses built their new report, “The Navy at a Tipping Point: maritime Dominance at Stake?” on a comforting trellis of assumptions: “First, there will be a continued demand for a safe and secure global maritime environment. Advantages to having an open world economy and trade for all major powers are growing…Increasingly, […]

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So a lot of people have been chatting about the Center For Naval Analyses’ new report, “The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?“.  As much as I like digging into a good Navy study, the broad-brush imprecision of CNA authors worries me.  Use caution before citing this report as a decision document. […]

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