So a lot of people have been chatting about the Center For Naval Analyses’ new report, “The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?“. As much as I like digging into a good Navy study, the broad-brush imprecision of CNA authors worries me. Use caution before citing this report as a decision document. 
Take this statement, defining the qualities of 3 “dominant” navies (Portugal 1470-1540; Netherlands 1600-1670; Britain 1713-1920):
Their challengers were focused on land conquests and regional power, while these nations built forces with global capabilities (long-range ships with sustainment and access). Their forces led the way in innovation of new platforms, materials, weapons, and operational thinking (caravels, fluyts, dreadnoughts). They also commanded more than 50 percent of the capital ships of their time (CVNs, big deck amphibs, TLAM shooters, SSNs, and SSBNs).
On a macro level, fine, OK, I’ll buy that. But please, somewhere, acknowledge that this is imprecise. I mean, by 1914, Britain had 34 dreadnoughts. The rest of the world had, oh, 56. And leading the way in innovation? It’s like the French “Jeune Ecole” never happened. What about Britain’s lack of appreciation for wireless technology? Or that France was the first to build an ironclad vessel?
What about industrial heft? Might the ability to build and rapidly exploit the best ideas in naval thinking be, oh, kinda important? Sorta? Maybe? Japan envisioned the first dreadnought, but couldn’t supply the guns. So the UK rushed in, and well, perhaps that’s why we call ‘em Dreadnoughts rather than Satsumas…
Oversimplify and researchers end up supporting a pre-existing bias. But I know, sometimes, oversimplification is unavoidable…just let the audience know. As a courtesy, you know?
But the real thing that makes me worry about this…this, uh…NAVAL study, was an odd omission in the “wildcard” section–where the authors tried to identify certain events that might “alter the constraints on the Navy’s future options.”
The CNA researchers identify four wildcards: 1) A Homeland Defense mission ” in the event of a maritime attack of a 9/11 nature.” 2) A breakdown of maritime security on an unprecedented level, where “at sea criminal threats could grow”. 3) A catastrophic loss of cyber defense and an increase in SATCOM vulnerability. 4) A change in foreign policy. All of these wildcards point towards a smaller “iky little boat” navy.
But what floors me is that, in the midst of an enormous world-wide race to acquire naval forces, the authors of this study refused to even consider that an actual SEA CONFLICT might kinda fundamentally “alter the constraints on the Navy’s future options.”
They always do.
Instead, the CNA researchers see a peaceful maritime future. That’s…well…one can dream, I guess. I’d like to see it too, but…sadly–outside of the Cold War–I’ve yet to see a regional maritime arms race end peacefully.
So…Rather than mirror image, and project our desire for a “safe and secure global maritime environment” onto everybody else, CNA–and the rest of us–had best do some thinking informed by something other than a happy life in the DC suburbs.
Maybe other entities out there define a secure maritime environment a little differently than we do. And getting that security may involve maritime confrontation with other countries.
This oversight is significant–A sea conflict will substantially impact development of the US Fleet. Failure to recognize that possibility makes me want to consign this CNA study to the dustbin…for the crime of starting with the desired conclusions already in hand.
But maybe I’m being too harsh. Any thoughts?
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