In the pantheon of privately managed Navy memorials, one of the most envied is the Intrepid–the centerpiece of New York City’s Intrepid Sea, Air and Space Museum.  Perched in Manhattan, the Intrepid draws in enough revenue to survive complex–and pricey–maintenance, grow facilities and attract a high-profile board (Including Xe/Blackwater founder Erik Prince).  To envious outsiders, the institution seems like it is on the right track.

Or is it?

There’s a few indications that trouble might be lurking someplace in the boardroom…first, longtime Intrepid President Bill White, already facing an unrelated legal probe into his professional conduct, resigned abruptly in May 2010–days before the NY Fleet Week.  The man didn’t even take his retirement benefits–after 20 years of service!  The Intrepid Museum refuses to comment on the matter, and Bill White has, for all intents and purposes, disappeared (for somebody who was, in 2008, angling for appointment as Navy Secretary, that’s incredible).  Hopefully it is just a case of a healthy management dispute (they happen), but…the story feels distressingly similar to the ex-USS Olympia’s run-in with bad management.

After taking a look at the Intrepid’s balance sheet, donors are key to the Intrepid’s fiscal health.  Bill White was an amazingly successful fundraiser.  He brought hundreds of millions to the Intrepid.  But all good fundraisers–even well compensated ones–get to a point in their career when they wonder if they should be getting a bigger cut of the money they raise.  The good ones don’t let their pride consume ‘em.  The others, well, they sometimes follow the path blazed by the Olympia’s long-time manager, John S. Carter.  I hope that wasn’t the case with Bill White, but…I worry.

What else worries me?

Well, there’s the management structure of the Intrepid.  Last year, the Intrepid employed 228 people, and paid $8.8 million dollars in salaries.  Payroll doubled over the prior year. Over $1.6 million went to key executives–Bill White made $389,000, the Executive Director $363,000 and four others over $200,000 annually.  The organization is top-heavy; fifteen staff members hold titles of “Assistant Vice President” or higher.  As much as I like to see people make money, that’s a lot of dough for the executives.

In the Olympia’s case, the rumor was that key employees were paid highly enough to ignore bad management.  But the other thing is that, again, the Intrepid’s real business is attracting donations and grants.  It’s a key distinction–and that worries me.

In comparison, the ex-USS Midway, docked in San Diego, focuses on the business of being a museum.  Rather than depend upon grants, the Midway’s revenue came from business operations–from getting people aboard the freakin’ boat.  To do this, the Midway employed more people than the Intrepid, (301), but had a flatter annual payroll of $5 million dollars a year.  The CEO made about $260,000, the CFO got $120,000 and the Developmental Director earned $106,000.  Not too many Vice-Presidents there.

Maybe that’s why the Midway made $4.4 million dollars last tax year while the Intrepid…it didn’t make a penny.

And that’s why I worry about the Intrepid.

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MV-22: General Trautman, your job is on Line 1…

by Craig Hooper on July 23, 2010

According to this DOD Buzz article, Lt. General George J. Trautman III voiced his frustration that MV-22 Osprey readiness rates in Afghanistan had topped out at “roughly 70 percent.”  Glad to see Trautman get frustrated.  As a taxpayer, I am too.  I expect better performance from brand-new aircraft.

According to the DOD Buzz piece, Trautman blamed the low readiness rates on, “incredibly fine dust and the fact that parts for the Ospreys must make incredibly long and expensive trips to get to the front.”

Well, aside from the fact that 5th Bombay Native Infantry Lt. Henry Pottinger documented Afghan sand issues as early as 1810 and the MV-22 program had years to prepare for the Afghan logistics challenge, deployed MV-22 readiness rates (using data Trautman offered Congress earlier this year) have gone unchanged–regardless of whether the MV-22s were in Iraq or at sea–a watery locale where there is, presumably, a little less dust than in Afghanistan.  Sand and supply ain’t the problem.

Read Trautman’s March 2010 testimony before the House Armed Services subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces.  He said:

“Fleet wide, our Block B combat deployable aircraft averaged approximately 60 percent mission capable (MC) in Continental United States (CONUS) for 2009. With focused logistical support provided to our deployed aircraft, however, we average nearly seven of ten aircraft available on a daily basis in Afghanistan. This compares favorably with the 71.6 percent availability over 18 months of operations in Iraq, and 71.0 percent availability for aircraft in the 22nd MEU.”

Deployment availability has, for years, been stuck in the 70% range–and, due to “aggressive sparing” the readiness rates for the CONUS MV-22 fleets can’t break 60%?  (I mean, “approximately 60 percent”? For the Block B’s only? The old training birds must be doing horribly…)

Look.  Trautman has complained about the impact of long logistics chains and harsh operating environments since the Osprey was first deployed in 2007.  The fact that the MV-22 readiness rates have not changed suggest Trautman is, in regards to the MV-22 program, completely ineffective.

America is at war.  It is high time for the Marine Corps to shut up and deal with these unacceptable MV-22 readiness rates–whether it is the sand, the logistical chain or the MV-22 platform itself.  We’ve not seen a substantive readiness improvement in years (And…while we’re at it…Does the MV-22 still cost more than $11,000 dollars per flying hour to operate?).

But the buck has gotta stop someplace.

General Trautman needs to fix the MV-22 program fundamentals.

Or we taxpayers suggest SECDEF Gates fire Lt. General Trautman and find somebody who can.

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The Army’s LSV: Why ignore the modern-day LST?

July 23, 2010

I have long thought the Army’s little Navy had the potential to drive some innovation–unencumbered by the Navy’s biases and relatively unfamiliar with the sea, the Army’s fleet has a chance to generate some creative tension by stealing a march or two on the Navy and Marine Corps.  Fabrication of the Army’s new littoral tool, [...]

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Violent anti-government extremism comes home:

July 21, 2010

From time to time I take a break from maritime affairs to focus on the the potential toll the “winking-at-anti-government-violence” rhetoric that is, for some milkook blogs, their stock-and-trade. Why do I scorn milblog armchair revolutionaries?  Because I think the “community” they foster encourages their desperate and dumb members to turn to violence. Milblogs should [...]

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In Press: Discussing the small boat menace and the illicit international arms trade on the BBC

July 16, 2010

File on 4, an award-winning news show on the BBC , sat down with me last week to discuss illegal arms traffic.  Part of the conversation turned to Iran’s appetite for high-performance boats, and that’s the piece that made it into this week’s File on 4 documentary. Allan Urry and the rest of the BBC [...]

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In Press: Proceedings article explaining the Olympia (C-6) debacle

July 16, 2010

In America’s constellation of troubled maritime memorials, none are more threatened than the Protected Cruiser Olympia (C-6).  This humble ship is, in itself, an American treasure of unmatched historical, technical and symbolic value (In response to Robert Farley’s twitter yesterday, I’d trade an Iowa Class Battleship for the Olympia–in a heartbeat!). Everybody is eager to [...]

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In Press: Quoted In the Des Moines Register on ex-USS IOWA (BB-61)

July 14, 2010

Last week I had a great chat with Des Moines Register columnist Marc Hansen about the ex-USS Iowa (BB-61).  In the resulting July 10 article in the Des Moines Register, I was somewhat blunt about the poor performance of the nonprofit Historic Ships Memorial at Pacific Square, the organization currently designated as the future recipient [...]

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On spying and premature gloating:

July 13, 2010

In light of the long-pursued “Illegals” spy case with Russia, every commentator under the sun has taken it upon themselves to mock Russia’s spycraft.  And why not?  The idea that Russia would maintain such a sad “odd lot” of characters is, on the surface, laughable. But resist the urge to snicker. There’s probably more to [...]

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Prompt Global Strike will transform U.S. Naval Power:

July 8, 2010

As many of you know, I’m occasionally contributing to the military.com universe as their resident Naval Analyst.  In today’s post, I wonder what will happen if, over the next two years, the 7,804 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells in the surface fleet suddenly acquired a Prompt Global Strike capability? It’s just a DARPA project now, [...]

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Virginia Class Subs: A rosy shipbuilding story…or was is all a dream?

July 7, 2010

For years, the Virginia Class has been portrayed as a shipbuilding success story. The subs have been, for years, touted as a model program–one that got the procurement price down and delivered boats at ever-faster rates.  But, as these vessels enter the fleet, are the efficiency chickens coming home to roost? A June 30 memo [...]

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